Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experiment.

This paper addresses the question of the effectiveness and permanence of temporary incentives to contribute to a public good. Using a common experimental framework, we investigate the effects of a recommendation that takes the form of an exhortative message to contribute, a monetary punishment and a non-monetary reward to sustain high levels of contributions. In particular, we shed light on the differential impact these mechanisms have on heterogeneous types of agents. The results show that all three incentives increase contributions compared to a pre-phase where there is no incentive. Monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, but a sudden drop in contributions is observed once the incentive to punish is removed. On the contrary, Recommendation leads to the lowest contributions but maintains a long-lasting impact in the Post-policy phase. In particular, it makes free-riders increase their contribution over time in the post-incentive phase. Finally, non-monetary reward backfires against those who are weakly conditional cooperators. Our findings emphasize the importance of designing and maintaining incentives not only for free-riders, but for strong and weak conditional cooperators as well, depending on characteristics of the incentives.

Social incentive factors in interventions promoting sustainable behaviors: A meta-analysis.

Based on a meta-analysis, this paper highlights the strength and relevance of several social incentive factors concerning pro-environmental behaviors, including social influence, network factors (like network size, network connection and leadership), trust in others, and trust in institutions. Firstly, our results suggest that social influence is necessary for the emergence of pro-environmental behaviors. More specifically, an internal social influence (i.e., motivating people to change their perceptions and attitudes) is essential to promote pro-environmental behaviors. Secondly, network connection encourages pro-environmental behaviors, meaning that the effectiveness of a conservation policy can be improved if connections among individuals are increased. Finally, trust in institutions can dictate individual behaviors to shape policy design and generate desired policy outcomes.

Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment.

Using a common experimental framework, this paper addresses both the question of the short-term and the long-lasting effects of temporary monetary and non-monetary incentive mechanisms on increasing individual contributions to the public good. The results show that both punishments and rewards significantly increase contributions compared to the baseline, but that monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, whereas non-monetary sanctions lead to the lowest contributions. The four types of incentives display long-lasting effects, i.e., contributions do not go back to baseline levels directly after the withdrawal of the incentives. However, rewards appear to have much stronger persistent effects than sanctions, revealing some sort of delayed reciprocity.

Network connectivity value.

In order to unveil the value of network connectivity, we formalize the construction of ecological networks in forest environments as an optimal control dynamic graph-theoretic problem. The network is based on a set of bioreserves and patches linked by ecological corridors. The node dynamics, built upon the consensus protocol, form a time evolutive Mahalanobis distance weighted by the opportunity costs of timber production. We consider a case of complete graph, where the ecological network is fully connected, and a case of incomplete graph, where the ecological network is partially connected. The results show that the network equilibrium depends on the size of the reception zone, while the network connectivity depends on the environmental compatibility between the ecological areas. Through shadow prices, we find that securing connectivity in partially connected networks is more expensive than in fully connected networks, but should be undertaken when the opportunity costs are significant.

Land use impact on water quality: valuing forest services in terms of the water supply sector.

The aim of this paper is to quantify the impact of the forest on raw water quality within the framework of other land uses. On the basis of measurements of quality parameters that were identified as being the most problematic (i.e., pesticides and nitrates), we modeled how water quality is influenced by land uses. In order to assess the benefits provided by the forest in terms of improved water quality, we used variations of drinking water prices that were determined by the operating costs of water supply services (WSS). Given the variability of links between forests and water quality, we chose to cover all of France using data observed in each administrative department (France is divided into 95 départements), including a description of WSS and information on land uses. We designed a model that describes the impact of land uses on water quality, as well as the operation of WSS and prices. This bioeconomic model was estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM) to account for endogeneity and heteroscedasticity issues. We showed that the forest has a positive effect on raw water quality compared to other land uses, with an indirect impact on water prices, making them lower for consumers.